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From Bandung to the DNS 
 
Daniel Oppermann 
 
 
 
In April 1955, the heads of states of 29 African and Asian countries met in the Indonesian                                 
city of Bandung for the Bandung Conference, the first African-Asian intercontinental                     
conference, officially called Asian-African Conference (AAC), also known as “the first                     
intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind”, as                     
Indonesia’s head of state and host of the meeting, President Sukarno, pointed out in his                             
welcome speech. From 18 to 24 April that year, the Indonesian government together with                           
the heads of states from Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan (also called the sponsoring                           
countries of Bandung) received leaders including Presidents, Kings and Prime Ministers                     
from another 24 Asian and African countries to initiate new forms of cooperation                         
among newly independent states (ASSIE-LUMUMBA, 2015; DIRLIK, 2015; PHILLIPS, 2016;                   1
SHIMAZU, 2014). For centuries, the countries participating in Bandung were held under                       
European colonial rule which blocked their economic, cultural and political development                     
and created a global imbalance benefitting development in basically all sectors of                       
European societies or the West as a whole, meaning the European continent (mostly its                         
Western countries) and parts of North America. While Latin America and the Caribbean                         
(the LAC region) were not present at Bandung these countries later joined the movements                           
and organizations of what today is known as the Global South and which will be                             
discussed throughout this chapter. The objective of the chapter is to draw a historical line                             
from the processes of decolonization in the Global South to the discourses and the                           
ecosystem of Internet Governance. The following pages will provide a discussion of the                         
Global South as a historical concept and a geographical region and its way through some                             
of the most crucial steps and negotiations in the context of economic and                         
communication disputes of the 20th century. The chapter will conclude with a critical                         
1 The list of all 29 participating countries in Bandung is Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China,                               
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (since 1957: Ghana), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan,                             
Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand,                         
Turkey, Vietnam (both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the State of Vietnam), Yemen. 
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reflection on the situation of Southern countries and actors in the current Internet                         
Governance environment. 
 
The Historical Background 
Different theoretical approaches are trying to explain the status quo of economic                       
development before 1492 when European rulers initiated the invasion and colonization                     
of first the Americas followed later by the colonization of the African and Asian                           
continents. James M. Blaut (1992) argued that all three regions, Africa, Asia and Europe                           
were on the same level of economic and cultural development when Europeans first took                           
over lands on the American continent. He denied  
 
“that Europeans had any advantage over Africans and Asians prior to 1492                       
as regards the evolutionary processes leading toward capitalism and               
modernity. Medieval Europe was no more advanced or progressive than                   
medieval Africa and medieval Asia, and had no special potentialities - no                       
unique gift of 'rationality' or 'venturesomeness'.” (BLAUT, 1992, p.2f) 
 
Blaut justified his argument by indicating the lack of evidence regarding a European                       
singularity of economic and structural changes in pre-capitalist (and pre-colonial)                   
centuries. In other words, while agreeing with the evidence that structural changes were                         
in deed taking place in Europe he questioned if these or similar changes were not also                               
taking place outside of Europe at the same time (Ibid., p.6). He furthermore pointed out,                             
that structural changes in Europe might have been a reaction to similar changes in other                             
parts of the world. Following this notion, the existence of similar or more advanced                           
societies could have impacted economic transformations in Europe long before the 15th                       
century. 
Following Blaut’s analysis, protocapitalist centers have existed on all three continents as                       
well as trade networks among them:  
 
“On all three continents there were centers of incipient capitalism,                   
protocapitalism, most of them highly urbanized, and most of them                   
seaports. (...) The mercantile-maritime, protocapitalist centers of the               
Eastern Hemisphere were connected tightly with one another in networks -                     
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ultimately a single network - along which flowed material things, people,                     
and ideas (...). The links had been forged over many centuries: some were in                           
place even in the days when China traded with Rome. By 1492, these centers                           
were so closely interlinked that the growth and prosperity of each of them                         
was highly dependent on that of many others; ultimately, on all of them. By                           
1492, the centers had become, in many ways, little capitalist societies.”                     
(Ibid., p.25f) 
  
The reason, European sailors arrived on the American coast before African or Asian ships                           
took the same way was simply a question of geography. Other relevant sea ports in Africa                               
and Asia were therefore more distant from the American continent (Ibid., p.30).                       
Consequently, it was location that gave Europe the advantage to grow from the                         
exploitation of the Americas which in turn was decisive for the later colonization of the                             
African and Asian continents.  
 
“After 1492, Europeans came to dominate the world, and they did so                       
because 1492 inaugurated a set of world-historical processes which gave to                   
European protocapitalists enough capital and power to dissolve feudalism                 
in their own region and begin the destruction of competing protocapitalist                     
communities everywhere else.” (Ibid., p.2) 
 
When a few centuries later the first countries had received back their freedom from                           
European dominance the situation was of a completely different nature. Generations of                       
Western colonial rule had not just created elevated wealth in one part of the world, it had                                 
also damaged if not destroyed economic, political and social structures in most of the                           
other parts and created an imbalance that the colonized regions would struggle with for                           
generations to come. A process that until today is widely ignored in the West where the                               
relation between colonization in the past and structural challenges in the present are                         
frequently overlooked if not negated. The foundation of today’s global economic                     
inequalities (as well as social and political) which is often referred to in the discourses on                               
“developing countries”, “underdevelopment” and also in the context of the South-North                     
debates was set already in the 15th and 17th century. Following Blaut, the “world's                           
landscapes were now uneven. They have remained so ever since.” (Ibid., p.2). 
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Bandung and Eurocentric Academia 
The Bandung conference in 1955, as a moment of liberation for large parts of the world                               
population from Western rule, also stands symbolically for a new chapter in both the                           
studies and practice of International Relations. As an academic field of analysis,                       
investigation and theory building, International Relations, just as other social sciences,                     
has always followed basically Western or Eurocentric points of view (and does so until                           
today). The fact that Bandung, as a symbolic moment in history for large parts of                             
Southern countries was not just considered a threat by Western powers but has also                           
received little attention in International Relations and other social science debates over                       
the following decades, underlines the issue of Eurocentrism (or Western-Centrism) in                     
this academic field. “Given the occasion — its scale, prominence and novelty, and the                           
media attention it attracted — it is surprising how little attention Bandung has received                           
in conventional international histories of the twentieth century.” (DEVETAK; DUNNE;                   
NURHAYATI, p.361). 
The challenging question of how to handle this situation in academia is partly reflected                           
in the contributions of Amitav Acharya concerning what he calls Global International                       
Relations (global IR), a possible extension of the current Eurocentric (or West-centric)                       
tradition. "Global IR is not a theory or method, but a framework of enquiry and analysis                               
of IR in all its diversity, especially with due recognition of the experiences, voices and                             
agency of non-Western peoples, societies and states that have been marginalised in the                         
discipline of IR." (ACHARYA, 2016, p.343f). In his 2014 article for International Studies                         
Quarterly, Acharya exemplifies this discrepancy by consulting the example of a                     
Kolkata-based college in the early 19th century in which British professors (Sahibs), their                         
ideas and traditions were considered to be of higher relevance than local Indian                         
professors (Munshis).  
Following Acharya, many researchers in Non-Western societies tend to consider the                     
history of traditional International Relations to be a replay of the Sahibs and Munshis                           
environment, especially since Western academics, institutions and publications are                 
dominating agenda setting while Non-Western regions or the Global South are                     
considered to be their objects of analysis or markets for Western ideas (ACHARYA, 2014,                           
p.648). This observation meets very well with Connells critical approach to so-called                       
“classical theories” in sociology and knowledge production in Western/Northern vs                   
Non-Western/Southern societies (CONNELL 1997., Ibid. 2014), just as Quijano’s analysis                   
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of Eurocentric knowledge production and proliferation (QUIJANO, 2000, p.549f).                 
Interestingly, also Southern academia has its part in this question by often ignoring their                           
own or analysts from their neighboring countries while Western/Northern voices are                     
frequently considered to be of superior importance. 
Bandung, as a crucial - if not  the crucial - event for the Global South in the 20th century,                                     
would therefore receive the suitable attention in a global IR approach. Also, following                         
Acharya, global IR “does not reject mainstream theories, but challenges their                     
parochialism and urges that they be infused and broadened with ideas, experiences and                         
insights from the non-Western world.” (ACHARYA, 2016, p.344). This means a stronger                       
inclusion and investigation of non-Western actors within the context of traditional IR                       
debates as well as processes challenging traditional Eurocentric views on history,                     
colonialism and the respective political research within Western traditions or coming                     
from a “temporally dominant Western civilisation” (Ibid., p.344). The idea of a global IR                         
approach is relatively young but is very likely to receive further attention after the                           
upcoming publication of Acharya and Buzan in one of the traditional Western                       
publishing houses in 2019. An interesting question is to what degree Southern academics                         
or societies will accept this attempt to “include” them into a Western academic tradition                           
by making them an extended part of it. 
When discussing the Global South we need to take into consideration that also this                           
concept is going back to a Eurocentric or Western-Centric view in Social Science, in                           
Political Science and in International Relations. When scholars of IR and related areas                         
simply speak about “the world” they refer principally to the Western world, mostly                         
Europe and North-America, or political actions going out from that part of the planet.                           
Other parts of the world are considered to be regions to look upon, case studies to                             
investigate. Some countries are simply “countries” (and they are usually located in the                         
North). Other countries are “developing countries”, “underdeveloped countries” or even                   
“least developed countries”. Some countries are simply cooperating with other countries.                     
Some countries are having South-South cooperations. Whenever Southern countries are                   
involved they get labeled in a certain manner, being the South, developing countries,                         
emerging countries and similar. And it is not exclusively the North that is using such                             
labels. Also in the South, researchers and policy-makers adapted to using the                       
South-terms while in the Northern or Eurocentric discourses more generic expressions                     
like “international” are used (international cooperation, international relations etc), also                   
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when in fact only Northern states or actors are involved. There is no serious discourse on                               
North-North relations, North-North cooperation or similar. A more common term is that                       
of “transatlantic relations” which however is also not referred to as North-North                       
relations. The Global South, today a concept of its own, became widely used in analytical                             
and also political discourses over the years. As a regional definition it comprises more                         
than the Southern hemisphere. As a political definition, it is related to political,                         
economic and social discourses on the so-called “Third World” and on the debates                         
concerning so-called “developing countries” or “underdeveloped countries” whereas               
development is often measured by Western living standards. 
 
The “Third World” 
The concept of the “Third World” that would define a larger number of debates over the                               
decades following Bandung was coined already before the meeting of the AAC when in                           
1952 the French sociologist Alfred Sauvy mentioned in his article “Trois Mondes, Une                         
Planète” for the French journal L´Observateur the categorization of the three worlds,                       
being a capitalist first, a communist second and an “underdeveloped” third world, as he                           
called it (SAUVY, 1986, p.81). Sauvy’s categorization of the different worlds, which he had                           
shortly addressed the year before in a Brazilian publication already (SOLARZ, 2012,                       
p.1561f), was used throughout a wide debate about political and economic standards and                         
developments over the following decades. A debate, that in fact is still going on and                             
which has created countless institutions on the international and national levels, among                       
them development research and policy organizations and programs, academic degree                   
programs, journals and more. Part of this debate is also the frequently recurring                         
question why it was the capitalist world that was put on the first position (First World)                               
while the Southern so-called “underdeveloped” countries were put in the third and last                         
position. A classification that generations of analysts, activists and policy-makers would                     
argue about and which would in fact negatively impact the attitude of millions of people                             
in Southern countries who turned the term “Third World” into a frequently used                         
expression to verbally degrade themselves and Southern countries as the last or worst                         
place on earth to be. By looking at the original writings of Sauvy however, it becomes                               
clear that he was on the one hand, creating the labels as described above, on the other                                 
hand though, also putting Southern “underdeveloped” countries in the position of “the                     
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most important” countries, “the first in chronological order” and called them “this third                         
or this first world”  (SAUVY, 1986, p.81). 2
While Sauvy’s categorization of the three worlds is considered to be the origin for                           
academic and policy debates on “Third World” politics (at least in terms of                         
conceptualization), Solarz has pointed out that even before Sauvy others have used                       
similar terms in different meanings not related to the debates on the global South                           
(SOLARZ, 2012, p.1562). Following Solarz’ historical analysis of the conceptualization of                     
the “Third World” it becomes clear that the idea to present Southern countries as a third                               
political force (partly) besides the capitalist and the communist blocs was successful only                         
in the first years after Bandung while in the 1960s and 1970s the “Third World” was                               
mostly associated with the discourse on economic (under)development (Ibid., p.1563).                   
Solarz therefore defined the “Third World” in 2012 as follows: “The dominant                       
interpretation of the concept ‘Third World’ at the present time is economic or                         
socioeconomic, focusing on the phenomenon of underdevelopment. Thus in general the                     
Third World is currently taken to mean poor, undeveloped countries with an                       
unsatisfactory quality of life.” (Ibid., p.1563).  
While the overall approach of this definition can be agreed upon (putting a focus on                             
economic and socioeconomic factors), there are (at least) two things that need to be                           
looked at. 
 
1) It should be questioned if the term “Third World” is actually still appropriate                         
today given the fact that the 1990s have fundamentally changed global                     
constellations removing or replacing certain actors from the global stage                   
(especially the so-called but never seriously termed “Second World”), and then                     
prominently positioned new actors in new places, including some that were                     
considered to be part of the “Third World” before. The historical conceptualization                       
and the end of the “Third World” as a concept was elaborately discussed                         
throughout the years including valuable contributions by Berger (1994),                 
Tomlinson (2003), Randall (2004), Alburquerque Fuschini (2015), and Kalter (2017). 
 
2 “Nous parlons volontiers des deux mondes en présence, de leur guerre possible, de leur coexistence,                               
etc., oubliant trop souvent qu’il en existe un troisième, le plus important, et en somme, le premier dans la                                     
chronologie. (...) Sans ce troisième ou ce premier monde, la coexistence des deux autres ne poserait pas                                 
de grand problème.” 
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2) The suggestion that the (now even more heterogeneous) “Third World” would                     
consist of “poor, undeveloped countries with an unsatisfactory quality of life”                   
places the question which countries are considered to be part of this “Third                         
World” concept and how to understand “undeveloped” and “unsatisfactory                 
quality of life”. Which countries in the world could be labeled as “undeveloped”? If                           
there was anything like being “undeveloped” at all, then surely most (if not all)                           
Latin American countries or the LAC region as a whole would not be part of this                           
concept and also many Asian and African countries would not. In the 21st century,                           
there are relatively few countries in the world that would fit somehow into the                           
category of being completely “undeveloped” in the sense of having no structures                       
whatsoever. In several cases, the actual question regarding many “Third World”                     
countries is the distribution of wealth and goods within the countries (besides                       
other factors). Many (if not most) of the so-called “Third World” countries have                         
middle classes that are consuming the same, partly the same or similar products                       
like middle class citizens in the West (although not necessarily in the same size or                             
quantity). This also includes countries from the UNDP LDC list like Angola,                       
Cambodia, Liberia, Rwanda and others. The question is not of being “undeveloped”                       
but largely of distribution of wealth and having strategic public (and also private)                         
investments (besides other factors depending on the individual countries). Also,                   
“unsatisfactory quality of life” is a very vague variable which not only depends on                           
the expectations or consumer habits of the individual but also on the standards                         
that are considered as the status quo. Living in countries with massive problems                         
of urban violence does not automatically result in “unsatisfactory quality of life”                       
for the population as a whole. Countries with high infant mortality rates on the                           
one hand can be regional leaders in information technology access on the other                         
hand. Also here, the question of distribution of resources is of central importance.                         
Without going deeper into the discussion of individual differences among                   
Southern countries it becomes clear that the “Third World” as defined above does                         
not exist (any longer). In fact, an interesting question to investigate could be to                           
what degree the “Third World industry” including organizations, programs and                   
journals, is keeping the term alive. 
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The Non-Aligned Movement 
Another important discourse to understand today’s concept of the Global South is about                         
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It is closely related to the concept of categorizing the                           
world into different groups of states which was reflected also in the discourse on the                             
first, second and third world. The objective of defending newly received independence                       
drove a large number of states towards the idea of being independent also from future                             
influence of the main powers of the mid 20th century being the capitalist bloc, led by the                                 
United States of America, and the communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union. “Structured                           
by the desire to maintain a careful distance from superpower alliances in the interests of                             
world peace, the movement of unaligned or non-aligned states would first take shape in                           
a series of conferences that began with a meeting (...) in the town of Brioni in July 1956.”                                 
(ABRAHAM, 2008, p.211). The ambition of not being aligned to any of the existing blocs                             
was present already in Bandung which Worsley also called the meeting of the Afro-Asian                           
Non-aligned movement (WORSLEY, 2008, p.133). At that moment, however, the                   
non-aligned states had not officially created such a movement but which was going to                           
happen over the following years. A key moment in that founding process was the                           
meeting of the three state leaders from Yugoslavia (Josip Broz Tito), Egypt (Gamal Abdel                           
Nasser) and India (Jawaharlal Nehru) in the year after Bandung. Nehru and Tito, who had                             
converged already several times since the 1940s (MIŠKOVIĆ 2009), together with Nasser                       
are considered to be the founding figures of the NAM. The exact date of the foundation,                               
however, is disputed in the literature. While the July 1956 meeting of the three leaders in                             
Yugoslavia and especially the Brioni Declaration of 19 July 1956 are often considered to                           
be the official starting points of the movement, the Brioni gathering was by some also                             
considered simply an informal meeting that was later followed by an official congress                         
being the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in                         
Belgrade in September 1961 (ADEBAJO, 2016, p.1192; DA SILVA, SPOHR, DA SILVEIRA,                     
2016, p.173). Non-alignment as a concept and as an expression was used by India’s Prime                             
Minister Nehru already in the late 1940s (LÜTHI, 2016, p.203). It was then also included in                               
Tito’s and Nehru’s joint statement signed on 22 December 1954. The statement  
 
“articulated the aspirations of the new and emerging force in the                     
international system — the non-engaged countries. In the statement, the                   
two leaders declared their intention to ‘devote their energies . . . toward the                      
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advancement of peace through negotiations, and reconciliation as the                 
means for the resolution of international conflicts.’ Tito and Nehru also                     
clarified that ‘the policy of non-alignment with blocs, which they pursue,                     
does not represent  neutrality or  neutralism ; neither does it represent                   
passivity as is sometimes alleged. It represents the positive, active and                   
constructive policy that, as its goal, has collective peace as the foundation                       
of collective security.’” (RAJAK, 2014, p.167f) 
 
Over the following decades, the original number of 25 member states expanded to over                           
120. And also the agenda of the movement saw increasing challenges, including initially                         
the positioning of the newly independent states within the international system and the                         
handling of conflicts with the larger powers of the Cold War, anti-colonialism and                         
decolonization and later a stronger focus on economic development (Tomlinson, 2003,                   
p.309f). 
 
The Group of 77  
The networks set up in the times of the initial Bandung conference and the movement of                               
non-aligned states also led to the establishment of a respective group within the United                           
Nations system. Three years after the first NAM conference in Belgrade, a larger number                           
of governments, mostly from formerly colonized countries, carried their collective                   
experience into the United Nations where they formed the Group of 77 or G77                           
(LUMUMBA-KASONGO, 2015, p.11). The experience of colonial rule and oppression forced                     
upon them by European governments over the previous centuries was reflected already                       
in the 1955 Final Communiqué of Bandung which addressed the need for economic                         
development for the newly independent states in the South, besides cultural cooperation                       
and the demand to end colonialism on a global scale. “Within the United Nations, the                             
Group of 77 was formed to pursue nonalignment as a way of consolidating strong ties                             
among the states, which were either formally colonized by the Western powers or those                           
with economic and political characteristics of the Global South.” (Ibid., p.11). Over the                       
years, the G77 set up chapters in a number of strategic places including Geneva, Rome,                             
Nairobi and Washington D.C. to directly address specific UN offices in those regions. 
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The group’s 1964 Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries picked up                       3
and elaborated on the demand for economic development for the community of                       
“developing countries” as was emphasized in the document. The approach used by the                         
G77 was much wider than Bandung and the NAM. It fully included countries from Africa,                             
Asia and South America and came much closer to what is known today as the Global                               
South, remembering that Bandung had a focus on Africa and Asia and the NAM had                             
members from Africa, Asia and Latin America/Caribbean but differentiated between                   
member and observer states. Against this background, the G77 is often used today as an                             
institutional reference of the Global South. 
The Joint Declaration was presented at the end of the first United Nations Conference on                             
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on 15 June 1964 by representatives of the 77                         
governments. It addressed the need for new trade policies that would consider the                         
situation of the so-called “developing countries” (FREEMAN, 2017, p.74). This included the                       
demand for a new and just world economic order underlining the importance to end “the                             
division of the world into areas of affluence and intolerable poverty.” (G77, 1964). A task                             
described in the declaration as an “outstanding challenge of our times” caused by                         
“injustice and neglect of centuries” (Ibid.). Following Freeman, the G77 “sought to unite                         
as a political bloc in order to try to change the international economic system through                             
the then new international organizations of global governance, particularly the United                     
Nations.” (FREEMAN, 2017, p.72). One of the principle activities of the G77 countries was                           
to advocate “reform of the laws governing international economic relations that                     
reflected their post-colonial demands for control over economic activity within their                     
own borders; for participation in the governance of the globalizing economy; for fair                         
access to technology, international trade, finance and investment (...).” (SALOMON, 2013,                     
p.36). These efforts included the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New                         
International Economic Order (NIEO) which was discussed in-depth by Golub (2013),                     
Salomon (2013), Toye (2014) and others. 
As stated before, the G77 often serves as a principal reference in international politics                           
when academics, analysts and policy-makers are discussing interests and concerns of                     
3 Interestingly to note is the difference of seventy­five vs seventy­seven countries in the text of the 1964                                   
G77 Joint Declaration which goes back to an earlier version of the document from 1963 when the number                                 
of “developing” countries at the UN was still 75. Since then, the membership of the G77 has increased to                                     
over 130 but continues to convene under the same name. The latest membership list can be accessed at                                   
G77.org. 
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the Global South. At the same time, however, the Global South needs to be understood as                               
a wider concept, more than a geographical region or a group of states based on                             
membership declarations. The geographical term of the Global South being an equivalent                       
of the Southern hemisphere is not applicable. Or to be more precise: it is completely                             
wrong. Taking the equator as a separating line between the Northern and the Southern                           
hemisphere, most countries that are today part of G77 and/or what is considered the                           
Global South are located in the Northern hemisphere. This includes India, Egypt and                         
(former) Yugoslavia, the three founding actors of the NAM. And while Bandung is indeed                           
located in the Southern hemisphere, the majority of the 25 participating countries in the                           
AAC were not. Also, one of the largest countries in the Southern hemisphere (in terms of                               
square meters) is Australia which is not considered to be part of the Global South.  
The Global South cannot be defined as an absolute category comprising an exact number                           
of states. It is not a precisely defined group of countries or actors, although the G77, as it                                   
is today, comes close to it. The Global South can be understood as a political concept, as a                                   
reflection and a conceptual result of a historical process that goes back to the first                             
Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, to the Non-Aligned Movement that was                       
initiated in the same period, and to the institutionalization of its supporters in the G77 in                               
1964. 
 
The New International Economic Order 
Decolonization and political sovereignty were key aspects for countries of the Global                       
South during the main phases of the Bandung and the NAM processes. This was also                             
reflected in debates on economic and social development during the second half of the                           
20th century. For newly independent states in Asia and Africa but also for other                           
countries in the Global South (like the LAC region) a central objective was to approach                             
and to resolve economic disadvantages caused by centuries of Western domination and                       
colonial rule. The objective to overcome economic inequality between South and North                       
was very much reflected in the debates on the New International Economic Order (NIEO)                           
that took place at the UN in the 1970s to create “an alternative order of global economic                                 
integration in which countries in the south could catch up with the economic                         
achievements of the north” (GILMAN, 2015, p.4). Through the NIEO debates and a number                           
of UN resolutions governments in the Global South tried to address the problems of                         
global economic inequality and had to face objections of a number of Northern                       
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governments that showed little if any interest in actively setting up equal economic                         
conditions for countries in the South (ANGHIE, 2015; BENJAMIN, 2015). 
The May 1974 UN resolution 3201 called “Declaration on the Establishment of a New                           
International Economic Order” indicated some of the underlying conceptions of the                     
NIEO like the objectives to “correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it                         
possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing                       
countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace                     
and justice for present and future generations (...)”(UNITED NATIONS, 1974a). Besides                     
that, the resolution criticized that remainders of colonial rule, foreign occupation and                       
neo-colonialism were still hindering countries in the Global South to improve their                       
economic performance, also because benefits of technological progress did not reach                     
Southern countries. Economic inequalities between South and North were therefore                   
increasing. Changing global economic constellations of a system set up during Western                       
colonial rule over the South was considered a solution by supporters of the NIEO.  
In the 1970s, this debate was to a large part focusing on raw materials and natural                               
resources that were (and still are) considered key aspects for economic development in                         
several Southern countries. Also, economic domination of Western transnational                 
corporations was addressed and regulation of these companies was suggested as a                       
potential measure to foster economic development and protect national sovereignty of                     
Southern states. This passage of the resolution on economic regulations plus the demand                       
for compensations for damages caused by colonial rulers called the attention of leading                         
industrialized countries in the North and former colonial powers. 
More detailed than the NIEO declaration was UN resolution 3202 called the “Programme                         
of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order”. Both documents                         
were officially published on the same day but it was this second resolution that brought a                               
clearer view on the objectives of the NIEO supporting states. Accordingly, this second                       
resolution asked for measures to improve the situation of Southern countries (at that                       
time and in the respective UN documents often called “developing countries”), especially                       
in the fields of raw materials, food, trade, transportation, finance, industrialization,                     
technology transfer and regulation of transnational corporations. Also the development                   4
of a “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States” was encouraged to “constitute an                             
4 Some of these aspects were later picked up again and specified in UN resolution 3362 called                                 
“Development and international economic co­operation” (published on 16 September 1975). 
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effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international                     
economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the                     
interests of developed and developing countries.” (UNITED NATIONS, 1974b). This charter                     
was presented at the UN as resolution 3281, a few months after the publication of the                               
action program. 
In several paragraphs, the action program asked for active measures to support the                         
economic development of Southern countries instead of letting the so-called market                     
forces alone decide on the future of post-colonial economies. Especially governments                   
believing in the well-being of citizens and entire societies through their own absence                         
rejected measures as mentioned in the resolution. Examples of requests made in the                         
document were the prioritization of products coming from the South and reaching                       
markets in the North. Therefore, countries in the North were asked to “facilitate the                           
expansion of imports from developing countries and provide a fair and reasonable                       
opportunity to the developing countries to share in the growth of the market” (Ibid.).                         
Another demand was to “arrest and reduce the ever-increasing freight rates in order to                           
reduce the costs of imports to, and exports from, the developing countries” (Ibid.). Also,                           
in cooperation, countries from South and North, supported by UN agencies, were asked                         
to set up new industrial capacities in the South to improve production and raw material                             
treatment in post-colonial societies. Some of the requests suggested the formulation of                       
an international code of conduct for transnational corporations which became an                     
international dispute in the following years since a number of influential governments                       
and companies from the Global North were not willing to accept regulations that could                           
affect the success of their own economic activities (BAIR, 2007, p.492ff). 
Seven months after the publication of the action program, the “Charter of Economic                         
Rights and Duties of States” was published as UN resolution 3281 (UNITED NATIONS,                         
1974c). In 34 articles, the charter touched on a number of issues that were of central                               
interest for Southern states, being again questions of raw materials, industrialization,                     
technology transfer from North to South and more. Also the regulation and supervision                         
of transnational corporations gained a prominent space in the resolution trying to                       
protect especially young and newly independent states from experienced mostly                   
Western companies which tried to set foot into the new markets in the South or which                               
remained present in the South since the era of colonialism. The resolution stated that                           
states should have the right to regulate and supervise the activities of these companies in                             
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their own national territories to make sure they complied with national laws and                         
policies. Besides that, the charter called for the right to nationalize and expropriate                         
foreign property (by paying compensations) and also to improve global trade relations                       
and international cooperation in scientific research and technology transfer. 
Over the following years, the NIEO project and especially the draft version of the Code of                               
Conduct on Transnational Corporations became subjects of intense debates and                   
postponements. Following Bair, the Code of Conduct was the most controversial part of                         
the NIEO project (BAIR, 2007, p.487). A draft version of the Code developed by an                             
intergovernmental working group in the late 1970s and early 1980s was supposed to be                           
discussed several times with the responsible commission and representatives of all                     
interested governments. Since no agreement could be reached during these sessions                     5
they were postponed several times throughout the 1980s until the end of the East-West                           
confrontation resulted in new global constellations and challenges that required a                     
different approach to economic debates. As a consequence, the draft version of the Code                           
of Conduct was declared to be outdated in 1992 and the whole process at the UN was                                 
officially suspended.  
A few years later, the role of transnational corporations was picked up again, this time in                               
the context of the UN Global Compact. Instead of requesting regulations for foreign                         
companies in Southern countries (as the NIEO recommended), the Global Compact                     
elevated the private sector to become an equal partner in global economic affairs.  
 
“The Code of Conduct, and the broader NIEO agenda of which it was part,                           
was an effort by the G-77 to define development as the politics of                         
recognition and redistribution. (...) Rather than pursuing development,               
what the Global Compact seeks are solutions to the challenges of                     
globalization. Multinationals, incarnated as corporate citizens, are             
conceived, alongside governments, as equal stakeholders in this collective               
effort.” (Ibid., p.497) 
 
The transformation of the central idea of the Code of Conduct to create a supportive                             
environment for Southern countries and post-colonial economies into a debate where                     
5 A draft version of the Code of Conduct is available on the UNCTAD website 
  https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891 .  
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preference was given to economic and financial interests of Northern economies was a                         
reflection of a period of ongoing neoliberal modifications that had taken place in several                           
countries parallel to the NIEO process. A shift, that was later also influencing the                           
consolidation of the multistakeholder approach which in turn became a fundamental                     
concept of the later Internet Governance ecosystem. 
Besides Bair, also Salomon (2013, p.46) and Gilman (2015, p.8) referred to the                         
unwillingness of northern high-income countries to make the necessary concessions to                     
the South to create a more balanced global economy. And it was McFarland (2015), who                             
presented this scenario in a more comprehensive manner. Accordingly, an early slight                       
support for structural reforms coming from US officials changed into an approach of                         
complete rejection.  
 
“The alternative projects that the United States promoted in opposition to                     
the NIEO, like the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the G-7 summits,                       
shared the NIEO’s goal of managing the world economy through political                     
means; they simply sought to place the authority for managing such action                       
in the hands of the industrialized nations rather than the UN General                       
Assembly. 
 
By contrast, neoliberal globalization as it developed after the 1970s was                     
based on a very different set of assumptions. Neoliberal economists argued                     
that the NIEO was sheer fantasy, a proposal at odds with the basic laws of                             
economics. They denied the desirability of any robust international                 
governance of the global economy and argued that intervention should                   
come only in the form of limited assistance to specific nations, along with                         
structural adjustment of economic policy at the national level to bring it                       
into line with free market principles. This school of thought helped                   
convince the Reagan administration largely to abandon any U.S. effort to                     
find common ground with the NIEO’s advocates. Neoliberal assumptions                 
became so deeply established in later years that no subsequent project for                       
fundamental reform of the world economy has ever been taken as seriously                       
as was the NIEO during its heyday. As a result, the NIEO debate stands out                             
as the last moment when the leading nations of the world demonstrated a                         
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real sense of their own collective agency over the global economy, treating                       
it as a system governed by rules that could be renegotiated rather than an                           
automatic mechanism beyond political control.” (MCFARLAND, 2015,             
p.218f) 
 
The New International Information and Communication Order 
The post-colonial reform discourse that was reflected in the NIEO debates also addressed                         
structural concerns of international and global media and communication                 
environments. In the same sense as Southern representatives criticized the economic                     
imbalance of the mid-20th century, they pointed out the unequal distribution of and                         
access to means of communication and mass media. National sovereignty as a central                       
concept of decolonization also included the necessity to determine cultural aspects of                       
each individual society. The dominance of Western media as a cultural intervention or                         
“soft power” influencing foreign (in this case Southern or post-colonial) societies became                       
the focus of an additional debate in parallel to the discussions on the NIEO. The                             
dissemination of Western values in the Global South became part of a critical academic                           
and political discourse on cultural imperialism or cultural colonialism that has                     
continued throughout the 20th and into the 21st century (partly also in the context of                             
Internet Governance), long after the debates over the NIEO and its additional subjects                         
had been suspended (SPARKS, 2007, p.85ff). 
In 1973, the year before the publication of the first UN resolutions on the NIEO, the NAM                                 
Summit in Algiers already discussed the important role of mass media and                       
communication and its effects on Southern societies in the context of unidirectional                       
flows of information and media content from the North to the South (or from                           
industrialized countries to developing countries). Out of this ongoing debate later                     
emerged the concept of the New International Information Order (NIIO) that was also                         
referred to as the New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) or                       
the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). As Nordenstreng (1984)                     
pointed out, the conceptual distinction between “international” and “world” order by the                       
different actors and organizations participating in the debates was more than a                       
meaningless historical detail but a reflection of political orientations and preferences                     
represented by the individual actors. In this regard, the discourse represented by the                         
Non-Aligned Movement frequently referred to the international character of its requests                     
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and demands (NIEO, NIIO, NIICO) to underline the importance of national sovereignty                     
while debates within the United Nations (and in this case especially UNESCO) used the                           
world as a reference point (NWICO). 
The Non-Aligned Symposium on Information that took place in Tunis in March 1976                         
discussed the concept of the NIICO and thereby prepared the way for the crucial New                           
Delhi Declaration on Decolonization of Information that was developed and presented at                       
the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in July the same year. It was the                           
New Delhi Declaration that emphasized the importance of a new information order in                         
the process of decolonization placing the NIIO on the same level of importance as the                             
NIEO (HAMELINK, 2008, p.292). Also the NAM Summit that took place in Colombo the                           
same year supported the idea of the NIIO. 
The discussions concerning the necessity of the NIIO that took place at the different NAM                             
meetings also influenced the debates at the United Nations. The UNESCO General                       
Conference in Nairobi in October-November 1976 addressed the latest developments of                     
the NAM summits and concluded in their final document (Records of the General                         
Conference) that to support the efforts of Southern countries establishing their own                       
information and communication systems, UNESCO should recognize the respective                 
initiatives created by non-aligned countries throughout the foregoing months (UNESCO,                   
1976, p.53). The establishment of a commission to investigate and discuss the current                         
state of media and communication followed in 1977. It was called the International                         
Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, or the MacBride Commission,                     
deriving from the name of its chairman Sean MacBride. In the context of the formation                             
of the MacBride Commission and the definition of its objectives, UNESCO officially                       
picked up the NIICO designation from the non-aligned states and changed it into NWICO.                           
The idea to establish new international communication and media standards through                     
the NWICO was later also supported by the UN General Assembly in December 1978. 
Over the course of the following two years, the MacBride Commission held a number of                             
meetings in different parts of the world (mostly in Europe, none in Africa) where its 16                               
members (regionally diversified, but almost exclusively men) analyzed and discussed the                   
historical and then contemporary situation of information, media and communication                   
in different parts of the world, always taking into consideration the specific situation of                           
Southern and post-colonial countries (UNESCO, 1980, Preface XiX). The final report of                       
the commission called Many Voices, One World (also referred to as the MacBride report)                           
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was published by UNESCO in 1980. It criticized the imbalance and inequality of                         
information and media distribution that became visible as a result of Western                       
colonization in the Global South. The same imbalance was criticized in the report for                           
supporting a “one-way flow” of information and media content disguised as a                       
“free-flow” while the report itself suggested a “free and balanced flow” of information.                         
(Ibid., p.35f). “Developing countries that were at the receiving end of international                       
information flows experienced the free flow of cultural products into their countries as a                           
new form of colonialism that threatened their cultural autonomy.” (HAMELINK, 2008,                     
p.291). As an important reason behind the imbalance was mentioned the unequal                       
distribution of infrastructure that was favoring information flow from the North to the                         
South. As a consequence, the development of infrastructure was recommended in the                       
report to improve the situation of Southern countries not just in relation to the North but                             
also to develop stronger ties within the Global South itself. Besides that, the linguistic                           
diversity of the world was addressed in the report, stating that of the roughly 3500                             
existing spoken languages in the world, about 500 were also written. Together with the                           6
pretension to provide information in all languages came the challenge to reduce                       
illiteracy as a major obstacle for exclusion of large parts of the population in the Global                               
South. 
The MacBride report recommended to develop national policies all over Southern                     
countries to reduce and eventually remove the obstacles that held these countries back                         
from reaching the same level of access to means of information and communication as                           
Northern countries. Further recommendations were made to develop policies promoting                 
national languages and media content, books, national radio and TV networks and                       
national news agencies. A special focus was given on the promotion of non-commercial                         
forms of mass communication to support cultures and traditions of each country.                       
Following the requests of former official NIEO documents, the MacBride report also                       
recommended the development of regulations concerning the activities of transnational                   
corporations in Southern countries. It also emphasized the “close relationship between                     
the establishment of a new international economic order and the new world information                         
and communication order” underlining the interconnection of the two processes                   
(UNESCO, 1980, p.268). 
6 In a footnote, the report from 1980 mentions a possibly higher number of existing languages. Current                               
surveys show about 7000 existing languages in the world. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3364712 
31 
Following Hamelink, “the Western news media began to take a critical attitude toward                         
the demand for an NIIO” already in the mid-1970s (HAMELINK, 2008, p.293). Therefore,                         
one of the essential objections “was the suspicion that the proposal for a restructuring of                             
the international information order would mainly serve the interests of authoritarian                     
states and would seriously undermine the standard of freedom of information.” (Ibid.).                       
Interestingly, a very similar form of argumentation as it was used about 40 years later by                             
US senator Rafael Edward “Ted” Cruz to criticize individual non-Western countries                     
during the process of the IANA transition (KANG; STEINHAUER, 2016; WEITZNER;                     
BERNERS-LEE, 2016). Others like Daya Thussu underlined that the lack of democratic                       
structures in numerous countries in the Global South was indeed an important reason to                           
seriously consider the criticism of Western media companies and political                   
representatives who saw in the NWICO a suitable project to control news coverage and                           
critical journalism in the South (THUSSU, 2005, p.50f). 
Throughout the 1980s the NWICO process suffered the same political blockades as the                         
NIEO did. The elections of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and of Ronald Reagan in                                 
the USA in 1980 were symbolic moments of a political shift that was disfavoring the                             
interests of the Global South but favored those of the economic sectors in the Global                             
North. The idea of supporting Southern and post-colonial countries to economically                     
catch up with their former colonial rulers was removed from the political agenda in                           
favor of a market-oriented approach which in turn excluded most countries in the Global                           
South from getting anywhere close to an equal situation with Northern industrialized                       
countries. UNESCO set up a number of meetings to further discuss the NWICO even after                             
the UK, the USA and Singapore had left the organization in 1984/85 as a result of                               
political disagreements and - as Nordenstreng emphasized - as part of global strategical                         
reorientations (NORDENSTRENG, 2012, p.37). This occurrence did not only cause a                     
financial catastrophe for UNESCO, it especially showed how leading Western countries                     
were willing to use their economic and financial power to harm organizations and                         
countries that were not following their specific economic and political models. The                     
damage that was done to UNESCO by the USA and the UK becomes apparent when                             
observing the fact that even decades later, the organization was still strictly avoiding to                           
address any kind of debate on NWICO (POHLE, 2015, p.383). 
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Internet Governance and Concluding Reflections 
In parallel to numerous state formations and declarations of independence in the South                         
and the subsequent debates about economic and political restructuring, infrastructure                 
development and basic education, a number of states in other parts of the world used                             
their historical advantages to invest in researching computer network technologies. The                     
comparative perspective on historical advantages and disadvantages allows it here, as in                       
other moments, to clearly comprehend the profound differences among societies and                   
their individual state of economic or technological development which in turn was                       
reflected also within the debates on structural reforms as discussed in the context of                           
NIEO and NWICO. And the disputes did not stop once it came to network computing and                               
the Internet.  
Two promising computer networking projects in the times of Southern decolonization                     
were the OGAS project in the USSR and the ARPANET project in the USA of which one was                                   
suspended while the other one developed into the Internet. After decades of                       
experimentation and the first creation of mostly academic non-commercial networks                   
until the early 1990s, the commercial Internet spread through a growing number of                         
countries exhibiting growth rates that increasingly caused debates within the                   
community of developers and beyond to find a more stable model of administration for                           
some of its technical resources like IP numbers and the DNS. This debate on how to                             
switch from the former rather informal model of administration to an institutionalized                       
solution was discussed extensively throughout the literature on Internet Governance,                   
albeit almost exclusively from the perspective of Northern industrialized countries                   
(BETZ, KÜBLER, 2013, p.70ff.; DENARDIS, 2014, p.161ff; GOLDSMITH, WU, 2006, p.29ff;                     
MATHIASON, 2008, p.70ff; MUELLER, 2004, p.141ff; Ibid., p.163ff; and others). Very little                       
is known and especially published to this point regarding the perspectives of Southern                         
countries that were not or at most marginally part of the early generation of Internet                             
nodes and users. Nevertheless, all these countries have their own historical background                       7
which led them to the age of computer networks, most of them coming straight from a                               
state of foreign colonial rule. And many have found their way into the Northern                           
discourse on Internet Governance, often not as a coequal actor but as a “poor” and                             
7 One exception here is BHUIYAN, 2014. Another different title, the critical reader on Internet and                               
governance in Asia (BANERJEE, 2007) has a section on Internet Governance, which however is clearly                             
written from the standard Western IG perspective. 
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“developing” or “third world” country. And in the same sense as the flow of information                             
in post-colonial constellations was or is historically going from the North to the South,                           
the Internet Governance discourse follows the same logic.  
The foundation of ICANN in the late 1990s is a reflection of the neoliberal shift that had                                 
gotten stronger since the 1980s when the debates on how to restructure global or                           
international constellations had moved from a more supportive political approach to a                       
less supportive economic approach. Although many early network developers in the US                       
favored a non-commercial approach for the Internet and tried to maintain this status as                           
good as possible, the interference of the US government in the early 1990s brought an                             
end to their plans. The conflict that arose between parts of the early non-commercial                         
Internet community around Jon Postel and others on the one side and commercial actors                           
as Network Solutions on the other side turned into critical disputes that ended with a                             
strict intervention of the US government represented by Ira Magaziner in 1998, shortly                         
before the official foundation of ICANN (GOLDSMITH, WU, 2006, p.43ff). At that                       
moment, the US government had already decided that control over selected critical                       
Internet resources like IP numbers and the DNS were going over to the hands of a private                                 
organization located in their own territory and without substantial participation of                     
governments - except themselves. As much as the US government had decided years                         
before in the context of decolonization not to support the interests of the Global South                             
but to put their own economic interests in the first place it was now making clear from                                 
the very early moment that no different attitude was to be expected in relation to the                               
Internet. A decision that showed itself to be successful for the development of the US                             
DNS and Internet industry for (so far) two subsequent decades. 
For many countries in the Global South (and in other parts of the world as well) this                                 
you-can-join-but-we-control-it attitude was not acceptable. ICANN remained a disputed                 
organization for years and caused intense debates during the WSIS process (BHUIYAN,                       
2014, p.51ff), the IANA stewardship transition process (MUELLER, 2014; PURKAYASTHA,                   
BAILEY, 2014) and also during the new gTLD program which was first promoted to have                             
an inclusive character for the Global South but in the end failed to achieve this                             
pretension. Exaggerated fees and the insufficiency of information for providers and                     
founders in the Global South (besides other reasons) resulted in a manifestation of the                           
status quo of the DNS industry in the hands of Northern companies. The unequal                           
economic South-North relations that prevailed since the “official” end of colonialism                     
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were confirmed through ICANN’s new gTLD program. While some Southern countries                     
(mostly in Asia, some in North-Africa) benefited partly from the new IDN extensions,                         
other regions (e.g. Latin America and the Caribbean) saw a declining participation of                         
companies in the ICANN registrar business which brought them (especially the private                       
sector) further away from the ICANN ecosystem than they had been already. The African                       
continent had the lowest participation rate in the program. Only 0,9% of all applications                           
came from Africa. ICANN’s widely spread message, the next generation of Internet users                         
in the Global South would benefit from having access to new strategical top level                           
domains turned out to be a letdown, also since the financial speculation with strategic                           
domain names under new extensions started frustrating public access to domain names                       
under new TLDs and therefore reduced a possible future participation of users from the                           
Global South. The globally active DNS industry which ICANN is partly supervising since                         
the late 1990s has shown that also their flow of digital services (in this case domain name                                 
extensions) is economically benefiting Northern countries while the South (with few                     
exceptions like China) is mostly acting as a receiving market. A market however, that can                             
often rely on its own ccTLDs instead and keep those financial revenues in the countries. 
When it comes to access to information on topics related to ICANN or Internet                           
Governance in general, the post-colonial (or neo-colonial) flow from the North to the                         
South can be observed as well. The lack of information and publications in post-colonial                           
societies and especially in the respective languages, which was critically addressed for                       
about two decades within the NAM and a number of international meetings and                         
organizations aiming at restructuring historically developed unequal conditions, is                 
today also reflected in the status quo situation of the Internet Governance community.                         
The lack of access to information can be understood, for example, both in the sense of a                                 
sheer absence of well equipped research libraries in the Global South (even universities                         
often have no funds to carry a sufficient amount of literature, especially not on niche                           
topics) and also as the lack of specialized literature in almost every language. As a                             
consequence, Internet Governance literature is (if available at all) imported from                     
Northern countries (physically or electronically), representing Northern perspectives               
and experiences in the same sense as scholars of coloniality, cultural imperialism and                         
knowledge production have discussed and criticized the transfer of Northern or                     
Eurocentric points of view to the Global South over the foregoing decades (CONNELL,                         
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1997; LANDER, 2000; QUIJANO, 1992. For a historical compilation on cultural                     
imperialism see also MIRRLEES, 2013, p.21ff). 
The failure of the international community to successfully restructure itself politically                     
and economically when Western colonialism came to its (official) end can today be                         
observed also in the global distribution of Internet Governance actors and communities,                       
ICANN registries and registrars, or the Internet industry as a whole. Interestingly, the                         
current concerns regarding uncontrolled multinational Internet companies are coming                 
mostly from Europe, about four decades after it let the Global South down on almost the                               
same subject (DOBUSH 2018). 
Connell’s critical discussion on so-called classical approaches and theories from the                     
North, on the development of social thinking based on Western or Eurocentric ideas, on                           
the Northern exclusion or ignorance of Southern historical and contemporary                   
approaches and perspectives is just one of many possible attempts to reflect on Internet                           
Governance and/in/from the Global South. Connell’s argument that sociology “was                   
formed within the culture of imperialism and embodied a cultural response to the                         
colonized world”, which she classified as a crucial fact to understand “the content and                           
method of sociology as well as the discipline’s cultural significance” (CONNELL, 1997,                       
p.1519), can be transferred to the context of Internet Governance as a field of social                             
thinking and investigation which was formed within the culture of neoliberalism (or                       
neo-colonialism) and embodies, in the sense of includes, a cultural and political response                         
to the Global South. A crucial fact to understand the content and cultural significance of                             
this research area. 
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